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A meta-analysis of prospective memory (PM) studies revealed that in laboratory settings younger
participants outperform older participants on tests of both time- and event-based PM (rs  .39 and
.34, respectively). Event-based PM tasks that impose higher levels of controlled strategic demand are
associated with significantly larger age effects than event-based PM tasks that are supported by relatively
more automatic processes (rs  .40 vs. .14, respectively). However, contrary to the prevailing view
in the literature, retrospective memory as measured by free recall is associated with significantly greater
age-related decline (r  –.52) than PM, and older participants perform substantially better than their
younger counterparts in naturalistic PM studies (rs  .35 and .52 for event- and time-based PM,
respectively).
Much research on cognitive aging has focused on retrospective
memory, or recollection of past events (for a review, see Light,
1991), and almost invariably it has been reported that substantial
deficits in this aspect of cognition are associated with normal
aging. However, interest has increasingly shifted to investigating
prospective memory (PM), that is, memory for future intentions.
Relative to retrospective memory, PM is believed to be more
dependent on internal control mechanisms (Craik, 1983, 1986).
This is because, according to Craik’s (1986) theoretical model, the
act of recollection is dependent on reconstructing events in mem-
ory, and it is suggested that this process must be guided either by
external cues, or in their absence, self-initiated cues. In retrospec-
tive memory tasks explicit prompts to recall are provided by the
experimenter, whereas in PM tasks the cue is not an explicit
request for action, but instead it requires either interpretation of a
cue or an internal impetus. It has often been argued that this
requirement for self-initiated remembering means that PM tasks
should be more susceptible to the effects of adult aging than
retrospective memory tasks (e.g., Craik, 1986; Maylor, 1995;
McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).
A distinction has been made between time- and event-based PM
(TBPM and EBPM, respectively; Einstein & McDaniel, 1990;
Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson, Guynn, & Cunfer, 1995).
Whereas the former requires the participant to perform a specified
behavior at a particular time, for the latter the required behavior is
prompted by an external cue. Of the two types of PM, TBPM is
therefore believed to be the most reliant on internal control mech-
anisms because, assuming no external mnemonic aid is used,
TBPM is more dependent on self-initiated mental activities, such
as active time monitoring (d’Ydewalle, Bouckaert, & Brunfaut,
2001). Thus, of the two types of PM, it has been argued that TBPM
should be especially sensitive to age-related decline (Einstein et
al., 1995; Maylor, 1995).
However, although many studies have found evidence of age-
related decline on tests of PM, this is not sufficient to infer the
presence of a differential deficit in this aspect of cognition, par-
ticularly because it has been suggested that PM tasks also involve
a retrospective component (Cohen, West, & Craik, 2001; Mc-
Daniel & Einstein, 1992). Successfully performing a PM task
requires not only recall of something that is to be done in the
future, but also retrieval of what it is that needs to be done, and this
latter component clearly implicates retrospective memory. Indeed,
Cherry et al. (2001) reported that two measures of retrospective
memory accounted for 68% of the age-related variance in PM
performance. Thus, if PM deficits are to be regarded as differential
deficits, then it is necessary to demonstrate that they exceed
deficits for tests of retrospective memory.
Empirical studies do not suggest that older adults are impaired
in all aspects of PM, and in particular, older adults tend to perform
as well or better than their younger counterparts in TBPM tasks
that are carried out in naturalistic rather than laboratory settings.
These tasks include measures in which the participant is required
to telephone the experimenter at a specific time over 4 weeks
(Devolder, Brigham, & Pressley, 1990), 3 weeks (Poon & Schaf-
fer, 1982), 2 weeks (Moscovitch, 1982), and 5 days (Maylor,
1990); mail postcards to the experimenter (Patton & Meit, 1993);
and periodically log the time on an electronic organizer (Rendell &
Thomson, 1993, 1999; Sawyer, 1988). In addition, older adults
tend to show better TBPM for attending appointments (Martin,
1986).
However, young and old adults may differ in their motivation to
successfully complete PM tasks outside of the laboratory (Patton
& Meit, 1993; Rendell & Craik, 2000). An important determinant
of the magnitude and direction of age effects on PM tasks is likely
to be the presence or absence of external aids to cue the PM event.
In naturalistic tasks, older adults are usually able to set up external
cues to act as reminders. The reliance of older adults on external
aids is perhaps not surprising as they tend to report more everyday
memory failures and more concern about this (Cavanaugh, Grady,
& Perlmutter, 1983). Thus, when required to make prearranged
phone calls, for instance, older adults use “conjunction cues,” such
as placing the action to be remembered with another routine event
such as having a meal (Maylor, 1990). Naturalistic studies offer
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27little control over the use of such external aids, and when they are
prevented, age-related benefits are typically reduced (Maylor,
1990) and in some cases no longer significant (Patton & Meit,
1993), although it is important to note that d’Ydewalle and Brun-
faut (1996) found an age benefit on naturalistic PM tasks even
when restrictions on external aids were imposed.
Despite greater experimental control compared with naturalistic
studies, laboratory studies of PM have yielded more inconsistent
results. Most laboratory-based PM tasks are in fact dual tasks,
where the participant carries out an ongoing task and must occa-
sionally respond to PM cues. Thus, in EBPM and TBPM labora-
tory studies, participants are typically required to exhibit a partic-
ular behavior in response to a specific event or at specific time
intervals, respectively, while simultaneously performing an ongo-
ing task.
Most laboratory EBPM studies report that older adults are
substantially impaired relative to their younger counterparts
(Cherry et al., 2001; Dobbs & Rule, 1987; Kidder, Park, Hertzog,
& Morrell, 1997; Mantyla & Nilsson, 1997; Maylor, 1993, 1996;
Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell, & Mayhorn, 1997; West & Covell,
2001), although some have revealed no evidence of age-related
decline (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Einstein et al., 1995; Li &
Blackburn, 1994). In comparison to EBPM, studies of TBPM have
more consistently reported age-related deficits (d’Ydewalle et al.,
2001; Einstein et al., 1995; Park et al., 1997), and this may reflect
the presumed greater reliance of TBPM on self-initiated retrieval
processes.
Indeed, it has been reported that during performance of TBPM
tasks, older adults tend to monitor the clock less often than their
younger counterparts (Einstein et al., 1995; Park et al., 1997), and
this may be attributable to deficits in attentional resources, or
poorer estimation of time intervals (Einstein et al., 1995). Maylor
(1998) also found that older adults reported thinking less about the
PM component of such tasks than middle aged or younger adults,
suggesting that younger people outperform their older counterparts
because they can keep the intention of carrying out the PM task at
a state of higher activation (Koriat, Ben-Zur, & Nussbaum, 1990).
As noted above, much of the literature has focused on differ-
ences in age effects on TBPM relative to EBPM. Where both
TBPM and EBPM have been examined in the same participants,
age-related deficits are more consistently associated with TBPM
(Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Einstein et al., 1995) and are typi-
cally more pronounced for TBPM conditions (McDaniel & Ein-
stein, 1992; Park et al., 1997). However, in some studies, older
adults perform better on TBPM relative to EBPM (d’Ydewalle,
Luwel, & Brunfaut, 1999; d’Ydewalle, Utsi, & Brunfaut, 1996).
Along with the distinctions between TBPM–EBPM and
naturalistic–laboratory tasks, a number of other dimensions have
been highlighted as important in determining the size and direction
of age effects on PM tasks. Particularly influential is McDaniel and
Einstein’s (2000) multiprocess framework, in which it is argued
that event-based prospective remembering can be supported by
either strategically monitoring the environment for the presence of
the prospective cue, or by relying on the prospective cue to
automatically prompt the target action. Because aging is presumed
to be associated with deficits in attentional capacities, this frame-
work therefore predicts that the magnitude of age effects on EBPM
tasks will be determined by the extent to which the task depends on
automatic processing versus controlled resource-demanding pro-
cessing. McDaniel and Einstein (2000) suggested that the follow-
ing factors may increase the strategic, controlled demands of
EBPM paradigms, and thus may increase any age deficits: (a)
nondistinctive PM cues, (b) a weak association between the cue
and the intended action, (c) a highly attention-demanding or en-
gaging ongoing task, or (d) processing of the PM cue being
peripheral to the processing carried out in the ongoing task.
Other authors have also emphasized the importance of various
factors in determining the magnitude of aging effects on PM. It
has, for example, been suggested that the nature of the ongoing
task is probably important (d’Ydewalle, 1995; d’Ydewalle et al.,
1999; Einstein, Smith, McDaniel, & Shaw, 1997; Martin &
Schumann-Hengsteler, 2001), with age effects likely to be reduced
if the cognitive demands of the ongoing task are relatively low (see
Maylor, 1995). The self-initiated processing requirements at re-
trieval also vary across studies in terms of the stimulus properties
of the prospective cue, and this may account for some inconsis-
tencies (e.g., whether high typicality vs. low typicality prompts are
used; Cherry et al., 2001; Mantyla, 1993, 1994). Moreover, it has
been found that older adults with high educational achievement
and verbal abilities (Cherry & LeCompte, 1999) and higher fluid
intelligence (Cockburn & Smith, 1991) tend not to be as impaired
on EBPM tasks as those with lower abilities. Thus, it is perhaps not
surprising that Cherry et al. (2001) argued that “Comparisons
across studies in which different methodologies were used invite
interpretative caution” (p. 191).
In this article, we address four issues relating to age effects on
PM tasks, using meta-analytic techniques. First, it has been argued
that age deficits should be greater for TBPM compared with
EBPM tasks, because the former is more dependent on strategic
processing and internal cues to action (Einstein et al., 1995;
Maylor, 1995). The first aim is therefore to compare the effect
sizes of age differences on TBPM and EBPM. Second, there is
evidence to suggest age improvements in naturalistic PM tasks, but
age declines on laboratory-based PM tasks. Thus, the second aim
is to quantify the relative effect size of these age effects. A third
issue relates to the predictions made by McDaniel and Einstein
(2000) that age-related deficits should be greater where an EBPM
task imposes greater demands on strategic processing. The third
aim is therefore to test this prediction by comparing the magnitude
of age-related deficits on EBPM tasks for studies that have used
experimental manipulations to vary the level of strategic demand
associated with tests of EBPM. Finally, we attempt to address the
prediction that the effects of aging on PM tasks should be greater
than those on retrospective memory tasks because of the greater
demands PM tasks place on self-initiation and controlled process-
ing (see Maylor, 1995). Thus, the magnitude of age-related effects
on PM and retrospective memory measures are compared.
Method
Literature Search
A computer-based search involving the Web of Science, PsycLIT
CD-ROM, and Science Direct databases was conducted. The key concep-
tual terms used as search parameters were prospective memory, intentional
memory, memory for intentions, and future memory. In addition, a back-
ward citation search was also undertaken (i.e., references in each of the
articles retrieved were checked). The search was completed in December
2001.
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Studies were included if they had a research design that compared
healthy young and older groups. Only groups for which the mean age of
older adults exceeded 55 were considered older. Although for younger
groups the mean age was permitted to vary between 18 and 59, we also
additionally required that the mean age of the older group against which
they were compared was a minimum of 15 years older. Also, the older
participants must have been community dwelling, and each study must
have included a measure of EBPM and/or TBPM. Finally, the study must
have presented precise statistics convertible to the effect-size correlation
(e.g., mean, standard deviation, standard error, F ratio, t test, standardized
difference [Z]), been published, been in English, and been written in a
journal. This latter criterion avoids the potential problem of the same or
highly related data being reported in journals and book chapters.
PM tasks were defined as event based if participants were required to
perform the PM action immediately following a prompt. Time-based tasks
had to be conducted at a particular time, which for some studies was at a
specified time interval after a cue. In Einstein, McDaniel, Smith, and
Shaw’s (1998) study, for instance, participants were required to perform an
action whenever they began a new task, but not within the first 30 s of the
task. In the present study, this was considered to be a measure of TBPM
because the participant was required to remember to perform the target
action within a specified time interval. In contrast, Einstein, McDaniel,
Manzi, Cochran, and Baker’s (2000) study in which participants were
required to perform an action if they encountered a particular word, but to
delay that action until they reached the trivia question phase of the trial,
was classified as event based. Although as with Einstein et al.’s (1998)
study there was a delay between the PM cue and the PM target action, only
in Einstein et al.’s (2000) study was there a second external “prompt” that
signified that the action was to be immediately performed (i.e., encoun-
tering the trivia phase of the trial). It should be noted that altering either of
these classificatory decisions would not alter any of the conclusions
reached in the present study.
Naturalistic studies were defined as those in which the PM task was
carried out during the participants’ everyday life, such as phoning an
experimenter from their home at specified times or attending appointments.
The strategic load analyses required identifying studies in which exper-
imental manipulations were used to vary the level of controlled strategic
demands in EBPM tasks, with McDaniel and Einstein’s (2000) multipro-
cess framework used to guide classificatory decisions. Where studies
included more than one manipulation, only the conditions with the highest
and lowest levels of strategic demand were permitted to contribute to these
analyses. These will be referred to as high-demand EBPM and low-demand
EBPM, respectively, throughout. In addition, only studies in which the
participants in the high- and low-cognitive demand groups were indepen-
dent of one another were included in these analyses.
Briefly, Cherry et al. (2001) subdivided participants in Study 1 and
Study 2 on the basis of the specificity of the prospective cue. Participants
in the general condition were told that the cue was a word from a particular
taxonomic category, whereas those in the specific condition were told that
the cue was a specific word. These conditions were categorized as high-
and low-demand EBPM, respectively. In Study 3, in addition to cue
specificity, cue typicality was manipulated (i.e., how representative partic-
ular target words are of their respective target categories). General atypical
cues and specific typical cues were regarded as imposing high and low
levels of strategic demands, respectively.
In Study 1, Einstein, Holland, McDaniel, and Guynn (1992) manipulated
the PM load by varying the number of cues used to prompt an EBPM task
embedded in a short-term memory task. The requirement to perform a PM
action in response to one specific target was classified as low in terms of
strategic demand, whereas the condition in which the PM action was
prompted by four distinct targets was classified as high. In Study 1,
Einstein et al. (1997) varied the attentional demands of the background task
(standard vs. demanding); these conditions were coded as low and high,
respectively. In Study 2, level of attentional demand during encoding and
retrieval were independently manipulated. The combination of a standard
ongoing task with standard retrieval was classified as low in strategic
demands, whereas a demanding ongoing task with demanding retrieval was
classified as high.
Kidder et al. (1997) independently varied the level of difficulty of the
ongoing task (two vs. three words to be recalled) and PM load (one and
three target patterns served as cues). Where the difficulty of the ongoing
task and the PM load was low (i.e., two words had to be recalled, and there
was only one PM cue), this was considered to be low in strategic demands.
The high-demand condition was therefore when both the difficulty of the
ongoing task and the PM load were increased. Finally, Park et al. (1997)
focused on PM performance as a function of event density. Participants
were required to perform a PM task every time a PM prompt appeared. For
both 6- and 12-event conditions, the task took 12 min. However, for the
former the PM prompt randomly appeared once within every 2-min inter-
val, whereas for the latter, the PM prompt appeared once within every
1-min interval. Greater frequency will presumably maintain activation of
the PM task, and thus in terms of level of strategic demands, the 6-event
and 12-event conditions were considered to be high and low, respectively.
Finally, effect-size estimates for free recall, recognition, and vocabulary
were derived from studies that also reported PM results. It should be noted
that for the majority of studies the items that were to be recalled or
recognized were unrelated to the PM task. Thus, typically a set of items
independent of the PM task were presented, with participants informed that
they would be required to later recall these items or discriminate these
target items from a larger group of items (e.g., Cherry et al., 2001;
Devolder et al., 1990; Einstein et al., 1992; Rendell & Thomson, 1993). On
only one occasion was either free recall or recognition used as the ongoing
task in which the PM task was embedded (d’Ydewalle et al., 1999): In this
study, free recall was used as the ongoing measure. It should be noted that
excluding the d’Ydewalle et al. study in these analyses did not alter any of
the conclusions reached, and thus the reported analyses include this study.
Recorded Variables
For each study, year of publication, and the number, age, gender, and
education of the participants were recorded for both the younger and older
groups. Twenty-six studies published between 1986 and 2001 met the
inclusion criteria specified. These studies are presented in the Appendix.
Statistical Analysis
Meta-analysis is a rigorous, quantitative alternative to the traditional
review process, as it involves statistical integration of results. The basis of
this methodology is the effect size, a standardized statistic that quantifies
the magnitude of an effect. In the present study the Pearson product–
moment correlation was used, which in mathematical terms corresponds
with the degree of correlation between the two variables of interest. It
should be noted that because the correlation coefficient is associated with
a slight bias, Fisher (1928) derived a transformation of the Pearson
product–moment correlation that Snedecor and Cochran (1989) have rec-
ommended should be used during statistical analyses in preference to the
untransformed statistic. However, this transformed estimate is itself asso-
ciated with a bias, and in a Monte Carlo analysis Field (2001) reported that
for random-effects meta-analytic models, transformed effect-size estimates
produced substantial upward biases of a larger magnitude than the corre-
sponding downward biases associated with untransformed correlation co-
efficients. Thus, in the present study, untransformed correlation coeffi-
cients have been used for statistical analyses.
For each construct, effects were pooled to derive an estimate of the
mean, with each effect weighted for sample size to correct for sampling
error. To do so, the random-effects meta-analytic model (Shadish &
Haddock, 1994) was selected in preference to the more commonly used
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This is because in the fixed-effects model the mean is presumed to reflect
a common underlying effect parameter that gives rise to the sample
observations. However, in the random-effects model the mean represents a
hyperparameter, as it allows for substantive differences beyond sampling
error that differentiate the effects contributing to each respective mean.
Statistically, the crucial difference between these methodologies is in the
calculation of standard errors and confidence intervals (CIs), which for the
random-effects model are typically much larger. For this reason the Na-
tional Research Council (1992) suggested that the latter model is prefera-
ble, as fixed-effects models may lead to inappropriately strong conclusions.
It was also important to test whether the difference in the magnitude of
mean effects between, for instance, TBPM and EBPM was statistically
significant. However, there is no agreed method for statistically comparing
mean effects by using the random-effects meta-analytic model. One issue
is whether the degrees of freedom in such analyses should be based on the
number of participants or the number of studies (Glass, 2000). Given that
a relatively small number of studies contributes to each mean in the present
work, it was considered important to maximize the sensitivity to detect
differences in mean effects. Therefore, the standardized difference between
the two mean effects of interest was calculated using total number in the
sample as the degree of freedom. On some occasions the same participants
contributed toward the mean effect for both variables to be compared (e.g.,
EBPM and TBPM in laboratory conditions). Although in these circum-
stances each participant only contributed once when determining the total
sample used for inferential statistics, it should be noted that including
particular subject groups more than once violates the assumption of sta-
tistical independence of effect sizes. There is, unfortunately, no elegant
way to deal with this problem.
To interpret how important a particular effect was in practical terms,
Cohen’s (1977) guidelines were adopted. These guidelines suggest that a
correlation of .1 should be regarded as small, .3 as medium, and .5 as large.
In addition, effect sizes were squared and multiplied by 100 as these
represent the percentage of the variance (PV) on a measure of interest that
is accounted for by group membership (i.e., being young as opposed to
being older).
Multiple effect sizes for the same construct were permitted from the
same study in circumstances where more than one experiment was in-
cluded in the study, or subgroups were created within a particular exper-
iment so long as the groups differed from one another in terms of the
participants sampled.
1 Thus, it is possible for a particular summary statistic
(including effect-size estimates) to be based on a number of cases (i.e.,
where cases refer to different groups of participants) that exceeds the total
number of studies (i.e., 26).
Table 1 summarizes the medians, means, standard deviations, and ranges
for age, education, and gender. In total, data from 1,470 young and 1,506
older healthy volunteers were incorporated in the results. The mean age
difference between the young and older groups was 48.5 years (SD 
7.78), with an age range from 17 to 63 years. It can be seen that the two
groups are closely matched on gender but that there is a slight tendency for
the younger group to be better educated. Although the upper end of the age
range for the young group is quite high (59), using a more restrictive cutoff
for the upper end of the young age group would not alter the conclusions
of the present work.
Results
A total of 152 study-level effects were calculated: 23 for natu-
ralistic TBPM, 9 for laboratory TBPM, 4 for naturalistic EBPM,
47 for laboratory EBPM, 20 for vocabulary, 22 for recognition,
and 27 for free recall. Where more than one effect was presented
for the same construct from the same group of participants, the
mean of these effects was calculated, and it was this value that was
entered when the overall mean for the construct of interest was
calculated. This is why, for instance, although there are 23 study-
level effects for naturalistic TBPM, the overall mean effect size for
this construct was calculated from 18 effects. All effects were
calculated either from precise descriptive statistics (i.e., means,
standard deviations, or standard errors) or from the F or t values
for analysis of variance (ANOVA) or t tests, respectively.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for each of the cognitive measures
revealed that the distributions of effects did not deviate signifi-
cantly from a normal distribution (Zs ranged from .37 to .92, all
ps  .05), and thus it is acceptable to use the mean as a measure
of central tendency.
Table 2 presents estimates of the mean effects and their vari-
ability. A plus sign means that older participants have performed
better than younger participants, a minus sign indicates the reverse.
First, it should be noted that with the exception of low-demand
EBPM, all of the mean effects were highly significant (p  .01).
All of the mean effects were at least small in magnitude, with the
PV accounted for by group membership, ranging from 1.9% to
27.4%.
With respect to the distinction among prompt types, in natural-
istic conditions younger participants were more impaired than their
older counterparts on TBPM relative to EBPM, but in laboratory
settings older participants were more impaired than their younger
counterparts on TBPM relative to EBPM. These differences did
not attain significance (Z  1.37, p  .170, and Z  1.27, p 
.203, respectively).
However, the direction of the effects was systematically related
to experimental location. Whereas both TBPM and EBPM were
positively related to age in naturalistic conditions (rs  .52 and
1 Partially overlapping groups were permitted on four occasions; Rendell
and Craik (2000), Rendell and Thomson (1999), and Maylor (1998) com-
pared the same young group against independent older groups; Einstein et
al. (1995) compared the same older group against independent young
groups.
Table 1
Demographic Summary Statistics for Prospective Memory Studies
Variable
Younger group Older group
MDN M SD Range N MDN M SD Range N
Age (in years) 20.2 22.5 7.6 19–59 1,426 69.8 70.7 4.9 59–84 1,462
Education (years) 13.9 13.8 1.0 11–16 513 12.8 13.3 2.0 10–17 546
Male (%) 38.2 37.9 15.1 0–56 584 40.0 37.5 11.5 0–50 573
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conditions (rs  .39 and .34, respectively).
Consistent with McDaniel and Einstein’s (2000) multiprocess
framework, tasks that placed relatively high strategic demands
were associated with significantly larger age deficits than those
that imposed lower strategic demands (rs  .40 and .14,
respectively; Z  3.33, p  .001). Although the mean effect for the
former did not differ significantly from laboratory TBPM (Z 
0.18, p  .859), low-demand EBPM was significantly less im-
paired than TBPM (Z  3.76, p  .001). It should be noted that
two studies were excluded from these analyses because the same
participants were tested in both the high- and low-strategic demand
conditions (Mantyla, 1994; Tombaugh, Grandmaison, & Schmidt,
1995). However, in both of these studies, higher strategic demands
were also associated with larger age deficits relative to lower
strategic demands (see the Appendix).
Of the retrospective memory measures, free recall was signifi-
cantly more impaired than recognition (rs  .52 vs. .37; Z 
3.52, p  .001). Next, a comparison of effect sizes on free recall
and PM revealed that age deficits were significantly greater for
free recall than for all types of PM (all ps  .05). Finally, older
participants performed substantially better on tests of vocabulary
relative to their younger counterparts (r  .40).
Heterogeneity of Effect Sizes
To estimate the degree of heterogeneity of the effects contrib-
uting to each mean, we estimated the homogeneity statistic (Q) and
the random-effects variance (
2). Table 3 presents these values, as
well as the standard deviation of random effects, and the 95% CI
within which random effects can be expected to fall.
For the PM measures, only EBPM in laboratory conditions and
low-demand EBPM were associated with significant heterogene-
ity, and thus the effects contributing to each of these means differ
substantively. The random-effects variance was estimated to be
.008, 0, and 0 for TBPM in laboratory, TBPM in naturalistic, and
EBPM in naturalistic conditions, respectively. For high- and low-
demand EBPM mean effects, the corresponding values were 0 and
.04, respectively.
For both measures of retrospective memory (recognition and
free recall) and vocabulary, significant values of the homogeneity
statistic (Q) were observed, and the associated standard deviations
of mean effects were .14, .11, and .19, respectively. However, for
neither of the retrospective measures was the upper CI positive nor
was the lower CI for vocabulary negative. Thus, retrospective
memory is consistently associated with an age-related deficit, and
vocabulary is consistently associated with an age-related
advantage.
Testing for Publication Bias
A number of validity threats have been identified that may lead
to imprecise conclusions in both nonquantitative and meta-analytic
reviews. Particularly problematic is “the file drawer problem”
(Rosenthal, 1979), which refers to the fact that significant results
are more likely to be published than nonsignificant results (East-
erbrook, Berlin, Gopalan, & Mathews, 1991; Sterling, 1959). To
assess whether this bias posed a threat to the results of the present
study, we constructed funnel-plot diagrams. In these diagrams,
sample size is plotted against the corresponding study-level effect.
If statistically nonsignificant results have been discriminated
against, then there should be a relative absence of studies with
small sample sizes that report weak effects. This was done for all
the variables except for EBPM in naturalistic conditions, as only
two effects contributed to this mean (see Figure 1; it should be
noted that the intersection of the x-ordinate and y-ordinate indi-
cates the mean effect size for each variable of interest). Although
mean effects based on a relatively small number of studies can be
regarded as less robust to the potential problem of publication bias
than those based on larger number of studies, it can be seen that for
none of the variables is there any actual evidence of this confound
operating in the funnel plots constructed.
Table 2
Mean Effect-Size Estimates and Associated Confidence Intervals (CIs), Statistical Significance,
and Practical Importance
Variable MKNS E
95% CIs
Z Size of r PV Lower Upper
TBPM
Naturalistic .52 18 699 .03 .47 .57 20.7* Large 27.4
Laboratory .39 8 613 .05 .49 .30 8.2* Medium 15.4
EBPM
Naturalistic .35 2 48 .11 .14 .57 3.2* Medium 12.5
Laboratory .34 43 1,705 .03 .41 .28 10.4* Medium 11.7
High strategic demands .40 9 268 .05 .51 .30 7.9* Medium 16.4
Low strategic demands .14 9 268 .09 .31 .04 1.6 Small 1.9
Vocabulary .40 20 1,553 .05 .30 .49 8.3* Medium 15.7
Retrospective Memory
Recognition .37 22 1,205 .04 .45 .29 9.1* Medium 13.7
Free recall .52 27 1,433 .03 .58 .46 17.0* Large 26.9
Note. Negative effect sizes indicate older adults performing worse; positive effect sizes indicate older adults
performing better. PV  percentage of the variance; TBPM  time-based prospective memory; EBPM 
event-based prospective memory.
* p  .01.
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Quantifying PM Mean Effects as a Function of Prompt
Type and Location
Across all PM conditions, highly significant effects were re-
vealed, although the direction of the effect was dependent on
location. Thus, whereas laboratory locations were associated with
substantial age-related deficits (rs  .39 and .34 for TBPM
and EBPM, respectively), naturalistic locations were associated
with substantial age advantages (rs  .52 and .35). This suggests
that even if aging is associated with a decline in the basic processes
involved in PM (which is probable given the greater experimental
control associated with laboratory studies), this does not translate
to deficits in everyday life. This result corresponds with findings
from studies of planning, which suggest that age deficits are seen
on novel laboratory tasks but not on more naturalistic measures of
planning ability (Garden, Phillips, & MacPherson, 2001; Phillips,
MacLeod, & Kliegel, in press).
Indeed, in naturalistic conditions older participants appear able
to not only compensate for any age-related decline in basic pro-
cessing mechanisms but also to substantially outperform their
younger counterparts. The superior performance of older adults in
naturalistic conditions may reflect more experience with time
management, knowledge of their memory’s fallibility, fewer dis-
tractions, greater opportunity to plan how they will remember to
execute the tasks, and more efficient use of PM cues.
In relation to the factors that McDaniel and Einstein (2000)
proposed that will decrease age deficits on PM tasks, naturalistic
tasks are likely to have relatively strong associations between the
PM cue and intended action. Better task motivation among older
adults (especially where the younger comparison group is com-
prised of undergraduates) may also be an important factor, as
TBPM performance is positively related to perceived task impor-
tance (Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, & Einstein, 2001). However,
it is unclear whether motivation only affects a subset of PM
studies, as it has been found that greater task importance does
not improve EBPM (Kliegel et al., 2001). Alternatively, it may
be as McDaniel and Einstein (2000) suggested, that the EBPM
task in Kliegel et al.’s study was supported by relatively auto-
matic processes.
Indeed, Kliegel, Martin, McDaniel, and Einstein (in press)
found that there was no significant difference among high- versus
low-importance PM tasks for an EBPM task presumed to rely on
relatively automatic processes, irrespective of whether the ongoing
task was normal (r  .24) or demanding (r  .05) in terms of its
strategic load. However, when an EBPM task was used that was
presumed to impose substantial demands on the strategic alloca-
tion of attentional monitoring resources, participants in the high-
importance condition performed significantly better than partici-
pants in the low-importance condition. This was true of
participants given either a normal or a demanding ongoing task,
although the magnitude of the effect for participants given the
latter type of ongoing task was larger (rs  .45 and .72, respec-
tively). Thus, where PM tasks impose substantial demands on
monitoring resources, it may be that the level of motivation or
importance attributed to the task is important in determining the
magnitude, and possibly even the direction, of any age effects
observed.
Although in our study TBPM in laboratory conditions was more
impaired than EBPM, this difference did not attain significance.
Thus, although it is widely presumed that the former type of task
imposes greater demands on self-initiation (Craik, 1986) and will
thus be associated with larger age effects, the present study did not
provide support for this perspective. However, a large number of
variables have been identified as potential moderators of the mag-
nitude of the age-related effect associated with EBPM (McDaniel
& Einstein, 2000). These include participant characteristics such as
level of verbal intelligence (Cherry & LeCompte, 1999) and as-
pects of methodological design such as the level of engagement of
the ongoing task (d’Ydewalle, 1995; d’Ydewalle et al., 1999;
Einstein et al., 1997; Martin & Schumann-Hengsteler, 2001), and
as has been discussed, the level of task importance (Kliegel et al.,
in press).
Table 3
Heterogeneity of Effect Sizes Contributing to Each Mean
Variable MQ d f 
2 SD
95% CIs
Lower Upper
TBPM
Naturalistic .52 14.9 17 —— — —
Laboratory .39 13.1 7 .008 .09 .57 .22
EBPM
Naturalistic .35 0.2 1 —— — —
Laboratory .34 105.3* 42 .025 .16 .65 .03
High strategic demands .40 4.4 8 —— — —
Low strategic demands .14 18.7* 8 .040 .20 .53 .25
Vocabulary .40 106.5* 19 .035 .19 .03 .77
Retrospective Memory
Recognition .37 54.9* 21 .019 .14 .64 .10
Free recall .52 64.4* 26 .013 .11 .74 .30
Dashes indicate that random effects variance is zero. 
2  random-effects variance; TBPM  time-based
prospective memory; EBPM  event-based prospective memory.
* p  .05.
32 HENRY, MACLEOD, PHILLIPS, AND CRAWFORDToo few studies have been carried out using similar manipula-
tions of such variables as, for example, typicality of PM cues or
ongoing task engagement, to allow a meta-analysis of the contri-
bution of these particular types of experimental manipulations on
the magnitude of age effects. However, we attempted to provide an
overall test of the proposal (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) that
increases in the strategic demands of PM tasks, which would
increase the size of age effects. This analysis provided clear
evidence that in EBPM tasks age effects are partially determined
by the level of strategic task demands. Consistent with McDaniel
and Einstein’s (2000) multiprocess framework, there appear to be
EBPM tasks that are relatively automatic—and for which age
Figure 1. Funnel plot diagrams of effect sizes against sample sizes. TBPM  time-based prospective memory;
EBPM  event-based prospective memory.
33 PROSPECTIVE MEMORY AND AGINGdifferences are minimal—and other EBPM tasks that impose
heavy strategic demands—and for which the age differences are
correspondingly larger.
The mean deficit for EBPM tasks that imposed a high level of
controlled processing (r  .40) was significantly larger than the
mean effect for those tasks that placed fewer demands on this
aspect of cognition (r  .14). Moreover, although the magnitude
of the age deficit associated with TBPM (r  .39) did not differ
from high-demand EBPM, it was substantially in excess of the
deficit for low-demand EBPM. Thus, the level of strategic demand
is an important moderator of the age effect observed, and it may
account for apparent discrepancies among individual studies in
regard to the relative magnitude of age-related deficits for tests of
EBPM and TBPM. As noted previously, whereas some studies
have found that age-related deficits are more pronounced for
TBPM than EBPM tasks (McDaniel & Einstein, 1992; Park et al.,
1997), in other studies there is evidence of the reverse (d’Ydewalle
et al., 1996, 1999). Indeed, in the present study, the homogeneity
statistic, Q, for EBPM in laboratory conditions was found to be
highly significant (p  .001). However, when subdivisions were
made according to level of strategic demands, the mean effect for
the high-demand subgroup was statistically homogenous, and for
the low-demand subgroup, the degree of heterogeneity was sub-
stantially reduced (p  .02).
However, when the number of studies (k) is relatively small, it
is difficult to determine whether there is significant heterogeneity
in effect-size estimates (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Thus, it may be
that, although much of the variance has been removed by strati-
fying EBPM effects according to level of strategic demand, sub-
stantive differences between the effects contributing to the mean
effects for high-demand and low-demand EBPM remains. Future
research is therefore needed to more clearly delineate which par-
ticular manipulations are particularly effective moderators of the
age effects observed.
It should also be noted that although several other PM mean
effects were associated with nonsignificant estimates of the homo-
geneity statistic (Q), for TBPM in laboratory conditions and
EBPM in naturalistic conditions, again the number of effects
contributing to each of these means was relatively small (eight and
two, respectively). Thus, it may be premature to conclude that the
effects contributing to each of these respective means measure a
common underlying parameter. It can be confidently concluded
that, only for TBPM in naturalistic locations, which was calculated
from 18 effects, the predominant source of variance between
study-level effects is artifactual.
PM Relative to Retrospective Memory
Although all of the mean effects in the present study with the
exception of low-demand EBPM were highly significant (p 
.01), free recall was associated with the largest age-related deficit
of all of the measures assessed (r  .52). Recognition was also
moderately negatively correlated with age (r  .37), whereas for
vocabulary a substantial age advantage was found (r  .40). Thus,
all the mean effects were classified as at least small in magnitude
according to Cohen’s (1977) criteria, with correlations ranging
from .14 to .52 (PV  1.9% to 27.4%).
Failure to find a larger deficit on either TBPM or EBPM,
relative to retrospective memory, is not consistent with the pre-
vailing view in the literature that of these types of memory, PM is
particularly susceptible to age-related decline (see Craik, 1986;
Maylor, 1995). Indeed, if anything, our study provides support in
the reverse direction: Free recall was significantly more impaired
than all measures of PM.
It might be argued that estimates of retrospective memory are
larger in this study because often these measures are not entirely
independent of the PM task. Although it was noted earlier that for
only one study was the measure of free recall used as the ongoing
task in which the PM task was embedded, and for most studies the
free recall and recognition items were unrelated to the PM task, for
a minority of studies, although free recall did not actually consti-
tute the ongoing task, following completion of the dual-task PM
measure participants were then unexpectedly asked to recall words
that had been included in the ongoing task (Einstein et al., 1997;
Mantyla, 1994). Moreover, in many studies the PM task require-
ments are revealed to participants prior to being asked to complete
tests of retrospective memory, and this may interfere with perfor-
mance on the latter. As McDaniel and Einstein (2000) noted, to
maintain activation of the cue–intention association, it may be that
executive resources are allocated to periodically bringing the in-
tended action to mind.
Comparisons of the present study’s results with other meta-
analytic reviews of age effects on retrospective memory do suggest
that the effect sizes for retrospective memory were particularly
high in our study. Three other meta-analytic reviews have revealed
that (expressed as the standardized differences between younger
and older groups) mean age effects for free recall were .97 (La
Voie & Light, 1994), -.99 (Verhaeghen, Marcoen, & Goossens,
1993), and 1.01 (Spencer & Raz, 1995). In the present study, the
mean effect for free recall expressed as a standardized difference
was 1.22. However, it is important to note that in the current
study the PM deficits expressed as standardized differences were
0.86, 0.73, 0.88, and 0.28 for laboratory TBPM, total
EBPM, high-demand EBPM, and low-demand EBPM, respec-
tively. Thus, even when the results from other meta-analytic stud-
ies are referred to, there is no evidence that PM is more impaired
than retrospective memory as measured by free recall. This evi-
dence goes against the hypothesis that age effects will be greater
on tests of prospective memory (e.g., Craik, 1986; McDaniel &
Einstein, 2000).
It is not entirely clear why free recall is associated with larger,
or at least comparable, age deficits than measures of PM. It is
possible that the calibration between retrospective and PM tasks is
not very close, and thus direct comparison of the age effects for
free recall and PM may not be a fair one. There are typically
methodological differences between retrospective and prospective
memory paradigms, and in particular, the former is typically
associated with list lengths that are substantially longer than those
used for the latter. This is potentially important, for it has been
found that “list length” moderates the magnitude of the age-related
deficits associated with tests of PM (Einstein et al., 1992). This
may preclude fair comparisons at the level of the individual study
as well at the level of meta-analysis. However, note that, unlike
tests of retrospective memory, PM tasks are typically conducted in
dual-task conditions. Despite this, the mean deficits for tests of PM
found in this study were comparable or smaller than the deficits
associated with free recall in the present as well as in other
meta-analyses.
34 HENRY, MACLEOD, PHILLIPS, AND CRAWFORDIt is suggested that the strategic demands of free recall may have
been underestimated. There is, for instance, evidence that age-
related deficits in retrospective memory reflect executive impair-
ment (e.g., Parkin & Walter, 1991), and Crawford, Bryan, Luszcz,
Obonsawin, and Stewart (2000) found that executive function
accounted for age-related variance in free recall and recognition,
even after controlling for general cognitive ability. Moreover,
increased retrospective memory load has been demonstrated ex-
perimentally to reduce PM performance in older adults (Einstein et
al., 1992), thus demonstrating that there is a degree of overlap
between age effects on the two forms of memory. Indeed, as noted
previously, Cherry et al. (2001) reported that two measures of
retrospective memory accounted for 68% of the age-related vari-
ance in PM performance, and Einstein et al. (1995) found evidence
that “self-initiated retrieval processes are an important component
of age-related differences across both retrospective and prospec-
tive memory tasks [italics added]” (p. 996).
Moreover, the present results provide clear evidence that at least
some PM tasks do not place such heavy demands on effortful or
executive processes as has been presumed and are thus not subject
to disproportionate age-related decline. EBPM tasks that imposed
low-strategic demands according to McDaniel and Einstein’s
(2000) multiprocess framework were associated with significantly
smaller age effects than EBPM tasks that imposed relatively high-
strategic demands. Our study therefore indicates that it is errone-
ous to regard all tests of PM, and particularly EBPM, as tests that
draw heavily on self-initiated retrieval. The characteristics of the
EBPM task in terms of the stimulus properties of the prospective
cue, ongoing task and retrieval demands appear to be fundamental
in determining the degree to which automatic versus effortful
processes are invoked, and thus the magnitude of the age deficits
observed. The present results are thus consistent with McDaniel
and Einstein’s (2000) multiprocess model that suggests that event-
based prospective remembering can be supported by either strate-
gically monitoring the environment for the presence of the pro-
spective cue or by relying on the prospective cue to automatically
prompt the target action.
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